Your internal systems stop listening to the internet. There's no open port to find, no VPN appliance to exploit, and no way onto the network for a device you haven't approved.
Remote access has been solved the same way for twenty years: open a port, put a VPN box in front of it, and hope. The trouble is that the port is visible to everyone, VPN appliances have become one of the most reliably exploited things on the internet, and a VPN that does let someone in usually drops them onto the whole flat network. Zero Trust Network removes the thing being attacked instead of hardening it.
Network rules written from a diagram always miss something, because the diagram is always out of date. We write yours from the traffic.
We watch what actually talks to what: which people reach which servers, over which ports, from where. Nothing is blocked during this phase, and it routinely turns up connections nobody knew were load-bearing.
Observed traffic becomes proposed policy, and we walk it with you: what's genuinely needed, what's a leftover from a migration, what should never have been reachable. What survives becomes the rule set.
Access moves onto the brokered path a group at a time, and the inbound ports come down behind it. Each step is reversible, so nothing hinges on getting the whole cutover right at once.
We run the policy from there: access for new starters and new servers, requests answered 24/7, rules retired as projects end, and reporting on who reached what.
Connections are granted only where identity, device, and policy all line up — and refused by default everywhere else, including inside your own network.
Endpoints and servers both dial out to a broker, so no internal service ever accepts an unsolicited connection. The attack surface isn't hardened — it stops existing.
Most intrusions begin with a sweep for something that answers. Yours doesn't answer, so you drop out of the target list before anyone has decided you're worth targeting.
Access is granted to a person on an approved device, not to an IP address that happens to be on the right side of a firewall. Correct credentials on an unknown machine still get nothing.
Rules apply between internal machines too, not just at the perimeter. Ransomware that lands on a workstation can't enumerate the network looking for the backup server.
Access can be narrowed by time of day or granted for a defined window — useful for the contractor who needs one server for two weeks, and for the vendor support session that should expire on its own.
Who connected to what, from which device, and when — plus every rule change. Segmentation is a standing audit question, and this is how you answer it with specifics.
Remote-access appliances are now among the most consistently targeted software on the internet, for the obvious reason: they're internet-facing by design, and they sit in front of everything. Removing the appliance removes that whole category of problem.
Speak with an expertFully managed, and rolled out a group at a time so remote access never breaks in the process. Book a walkthrough and we'll show you what of yours is reachable from the outside today.
Network decides what can be reached. The other two decide what is allowed to run on the machine, and which devices get into your cloud tenants.
Controls what is allowed to run. Only approved software executes, and each approved application is fenced in so a hijacked one still can't reach the files or the network it was hijacked for.
See how it worksControls which devices may reach your cloud tenants. A stolen password and a bypassed MFA prompt still don't open Microsoft 365, because the sign-in has to arrive from a device you approved.
See how it works